A real-time process algebra, enhanced with speciÿc constructs for handling cryptographic primitives, is proposed to model cryptographic protocols in a simple way. We show that some security properties, such as authentication and secrecy, can be re-formulated in this timed setting. Moreover, we show that they can be seen as suitable instances of a general information ow-like scheme, called timed generalized non-deducibility on compositions (tGNDC), parametric w.r.t. the observational semantics of interest. We show that, when considering timed trace semantics, there exists a most powerful hostile environment (or enemy) that can try to compromise the protocol. Moreover, we present a couple of compositionality results for tGNDC, one of which is time dependent, and show their usefulness by means of a case study.
Introduction
In recent years there has been an increasing interest in the formal analysis of cryptographic protocols, as they have become the basic building blocks for many distributed services, such as home banking or electronic commerce. These analyzes have been very successful in many cases, uncovering subtle inaccuracies in many speciÿcations of cryptographic protocols. However, such analyses are usually restricted to very high abstractions of the real protocols, where concrete information about the timing of events are usually omitted (with some relevant exceptions such as [2, 23] ).
Our starting point is the work on cryptographic security process algebra (CryptoSPA) [7, 10] , which is an extension of SPA [5] (a CCS-like process algebra with actions belonging to two di erent levels of conÿdentiality), with some new constructs for handling cryptographic primitives. For such a language a general schema for the deÿnition of security properties, called GNDC, has been proposed [10] . It is based on the idea of checking the system against all the possible hostile environments. The general schema has the following form:
P satisÿes S / i ∀X ∈ Env : P X / (P);
where the general property S / requires that the system P satisÿes (via the behavioral pre-order /) a speciÿcation (P) when composed in parallel with any possible hostile environment (or enemy) X . The problem of the universal quantiÿcation is overcome when it is possible to show that there exists the "most powerful" enemy; hence, one check against the most powerful enemy is as discriminating as an inÿnity of di erent checks against all the possible enemies. This lucky case occurs when the behavioral pre-order / is a congruence w.r.t. parallel composition and restriction, e.g., for trace semantics.
The main goal of this paper is to show that the real-time information ow theory developed for tSPA (a real-time extension of SPA reported in [9] ), can be extended to CryptoSPA, yielding timed CryptoSPA (tCryptoSPA). The main results from such an e ort are the following: -A language for describing cryptographic protocols, where information about the concrete timing of events is necessary, e.g., because of the presence of timeouts or time-stamps. -A general scheme, called timed generalized non-deducibility on compositions (tGNDC), for describing uniformly the many security properties in a real-time setting; we will present three instances of such a general scheme, namely timed authentication, timed integrity and timed secrecy. -Some speciÿc results for the security properties based on semantics that are precongruences, such as the existence of a (real-time) most general enemy.
Moreover, we will propose some compositionality results, i.e., we will show some conditions under which secure real-time protocols can be safely composed. In particular, we show that under some conditions on the knowledge that a protocol accumulates during its lifetime, the tGNDC property is compositional; in one case, such a condition is time dependent, hence more easily applicable to real-life case studies.
As a running example, we will consider the timed version of the Wide-Mouthed Frog protocol (WMF). The choice has been driven by its simplicity; nonetheless, the WMF protocol is expressive enough to discuss some interesting issues, e.g., the timed version of authentication, integrity and secrecy.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we deÿne the tCryptoSPA syntax and its operational semantics. In Section 3 we deÿne the general schema tGNDC, hence the notion of hostile environment (or enemy) and we present some general results, such as the existence of a real-time most general enemy. In Section 4 we present some security properties, namely tNDC, timed authentication, timed integrity and timed secrecy. Section 5 reports some results about conditions for safe composition of real-time security protocols. In Section 6 we report some concluding remarks and a comparison with related literature. Finally, in the appendix, we give some detailed proofs.
The model
In this section we present the model we will use for the speciÿcation of cryptographic protocols and security properties. It is a real-time extension of the CryptoSPA proposed in [10, 7] . In CryptoSPA it is possible to express qualitative ordering among events, while quantitative timing aspects cannot be expressed. Thus, we extend CryptoSPA with operators that permit to express the elapsing of time.
The syntax of the language
We call the language timed cryptographic security process algebra (tCryptoSPA for short). Its syntax is based on the following elements:
-A set Ch of channels, partitioned into a set I of input channels (ranged over by c) and a set O of output channels (ranged over by c, the output corresponding to the input c); -A set M of messages; -A set Var of variables, ranged over by x; -A set Const of constants, ranged over by A.
The set L of tCryptoSPA terms (or processes) is deÿned as follows:
A(e 1 ; : : : ; e n ) | [ e 1 ; : : : ; e r rule x]P | Ã(P); where e; e 1 ; : : : ; e r are messages or variables and L is a set of channels. Both the operators c(x):P and [ e 1 : : : e r rule x]P bind the variable x in P.
Besides the standard (value-passing) CCS operators [19] , we have an additional preÿx action tick, used to model time elapsing, a delay operator Ã(P), used to make lazy the initial actions of P, and the operator [ m 1 : : : m r rule x]P introduced in order to model message handling and cryptography. Informally, process [ m 1 : : : m r rule x]P tries to deduce a piece of information z from the tuple of messages m 1 : : : m r through one application of rule rule ; if it succeeds, then it behaves like P[z=x], otherwise it is stuck. See the next subsection for a more detailed explanation of the inference rules.
The time model we use is known as the ÿctitious clock approach, see e.g. [24] . A global clock is supposed to be updated whenever all the processes agree on this, by globally synchronizing on action tick. All the other actions are assumed to take no time. This is reasonable if we choose a time unit such that the actual time of an action is negligible w.r.t. the time unit. Hence, the computation proceeds in lock-steps: between global synchronizations on action tick (that represent the elapsing of one time unit), all the processes proceed asynchronously by performing actions without duration.
Let Def : Const → L be a set of deÿning equations of the form A(x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) def = P, where P may contain no free variables except x 1 ; : : : ; x n , which must be distinct. Constants permit us to deÿne recursive processes, but we have to be a bit careful in using them. A term P is closed w.r.t. Def if all the constants occurring in P are deÿned in Def (and, recursively, for their deÿning terms). A term P is guarded w.r.t. Def if all the constants occurring in P (and, recursively, for their deÿning terms) occur in a preÿx context [19] .
The set Act = {c(m) | c ∈ I } ∪ { cm | c ∈ O} ∪ { } ∪ {tick} of actions ( is the internal, invisible action, tick is the special action used to model time elapsing) is ranged over by a (with abuse of notation), while l ranges over Act\{tick}. We call P the set of all the tCryptoSPA closed terms (i.e., with no free variables), that are closed and guarded w.r.t. Def . We deÿne sort(P) to be the set of all the channels syntactically occurring in the term P. Moreover, for the sake of readability, we always omit the termination 0 at the end of process speciÿcations, e.g., we write a in place of a:0.
We give an informal overview of tCryptoSPA operators:
-0 is a process that does nothing; -c(x):P represents the process that can get an input m on channel c behaving like P where all the occurrences of x are replaced by m (written P[m=x]); -cm:P is the process that can send m on channel c, and then behaves like P; -:P is the process that executes the invisible action and then behaves like P; -tick:P is a process willing to let one time unit pass and then behaves as P; -P 1 + P 2 (choice) represents the non-deterministic choice between the two processes P 1 and P 2 ; time passes when both P 1 and P 2 are able to perform a tick actionand in such a case by performing tick a conÿguration where both the derivatives of the summands can still be chosen is reached-or when only one of the two can perform tick-and in such a case the other summand is discarded; moreover, -preÿxed summands have priority over tick preÿxed summands. -P 1 P 2 (parallel) is the parallel composition of two processes that can proceed in an asynchronous way but that must synchronize on complementary actions to make a communication, represented by a . Both components must agree on performing a tick action, and this can be done even if a communication is possible; -P\L is the process that cannot send and receive messages on channels in L; for all the other channels it behaves exactly like P; -A(m 1 ; : : : ; m n ) behaves like the respective deÿning term P where all the variables x 1 ; : : : ; x n are replaced by the messages m 1 ; : : : ; m n ; -[ m 1 ; : : : ; m r rule x]P is the process used to model message handling and cryptography; Fig. 1 . An example inference system for shared key cryptography.
-Ã(P) (idling) allows process P to wait indeÿnitely. At every instant of time, if process P performs an action l, then the whole system proceeds in this state, while dropping the idling operator.
The operational semantics of tCryptoSPA
The data handling part of the language consists of a set of inference rules used to deduce messages from other messages. Deÿnition 1. We consider a set of relations among closed messages as: r ⊆ P fin (M) × M, where r is the name of the rule. Given a set R of inference rules, we consider the deduction relation
Given a ÿnite set of closed messages, say , then ( ; M ) ∈ D R if M can be derived by iteratively applying the rules in R. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that r (for each r ∈ R) and
Note that the tCryptoSPA syntax, its semantics and the results obtained are completely parametric w.r.t. the inference system in use. We present in Fig. 1 the same inference system of [10] . This inference system can combine two messages obtaining a pair (rule pair ); it can extract one message from a pair (rules fst and snd ); it can encrypt a message m with a key k obtaining {m} k and ÿnally decrypt a message of the form {m} k only if it has the same key k (rules enc and dec ). In this framework, cryptography is completely reliable, i.e., a crypted message can be deciphered only by knowing the suitable decryption key and can be produced only by knowing the key, too.
In a similar way, the inference system can contain rules for handling the basic arithmetic operations and Boolean relations among numbers. Example 1. Natural numbers may be encoded by assuming a single value 0 and a function symbol S, with the following rule:
So we will often use n + 1 to indicate the application of rule inc with n as argument. Similarly, we can deÿne summations and other operations on natural numbers.
Remark 1.
It is worthy noticing that during the security analysis we will allow enemies to initially know only a given set of messages. All the other messages will be deduced by using a given set of inference rules. This is useful for many purposes. For instance, this gives us a way to model fresh nonces creation. Indeed, one may give to each participant in a protocol a di erent seed for generating nonces and using a rule similar to the one for modeling natural numbers to produce nonces. The enemies will not initially know neither the seed nor the rule for creating the nonces. In such a way, the enemy may obtain a nonce only by receiving it.
Example 2. We do not explicitly deÿne equality check among messages in the syntax. However, this can be implemented through the usage of the inference construct. For example, consider rule n n Equal(n; n) equal: The operational semantics of tCryptoSPA is described by means of the labeled transition system (lts for short) P; Act; { a →} a∈Act , where { a →} a∈Act is the least relation between tCryptoSPA processes induced by the axioms and inference rules of Fig. 2 . Such a relation is well-deÿned even if negative premises occur in a rule for the idling operator and in one rule for +, because the relation is strictly stratiÿable [15] . Note that tCryptoSPA is tick-deterministic i.e., the time elapsing never moves a process to two di erent states. The proof of the following proposition can be easily given by inspecting the operational rules. In particular, the ÿrst two rules of the idling operator and the rules for non-deterministic choice are the key rules enforcing time determinacy. Proposition 1. For every tCryptoSPA process P we have If P tick → P and P tick → P ; then P = P : Example 3. In tCryptoSPA there are processes, such as 0, that do not allow time to proceed; hence, as rule 3 for parallel composition forces a global synchronization on tick actions, the e ect of composing a process P with 0 is to prevent P from letting time pass. In other words, 0 acts as a time annihilator for its parallel context. On the contrary, Ã(0) is a process that, even if functionally terminated, lets time proceed indeÿnitely. Hence, Ã(0) acts as a neutral element for parallel composition.
Example 4. Consider a process P = (Ã(a) Ã( a))\a that can perform any sequence (possibly empty) of tick actions followed by a . It is worth observing that, contrary to tSPA [9] , we do not assume maximal communication progress, i.e., 's do not have priority over tick actions or, equivalently, a process cannot idle if it can perform a . Hence, in tSPA process P can perform only the sequence . Example 5. We can easily model timeout constructs in tCryptoSPA.
Assume n 1 6n 2 and deÿne a process
Time out(n 1 ; n 2 ; A; B) = tick n1 :Ã(A) + tick n2 : :B:
By looking at the rules for choice and idling, we see that Time out(n 1 ; n 2 ; A; B) ÿrst performs a sequence of n 1 tick actions; then, the system may perform other n 2 −n 1 tick actions, unless A resolves the choice by performing an action; instead if A does nothing, after n 2 units of time, through the execution of action , the process is forced to act as B. Note that rule + 3 is responsible for preventing the selection of process A at timeout expiration. This semantics for the + operator is di erent from the one in tSPA (a tick action can be performed only if both summands can do so) and is motivated by the need of a more exible way of programming the choice between di erent components.
Remark 2.
Note that an attempt to deÿne the Ã operator as a derived one, e.g. Ã P = tick: Ã P + P would fail because of the deÿnition of the + operator that does not allow tick actions when P can perform a action (see rule + 3 ). 
The WMF protocol
As a simple example, we recall the WMF protocol. The aim of the protocol is to establish a session key from an initiator A to a responder B by means of a server S and using shared key cryptography. The protocol, as reported in [3] , is as follows:
where T a and T s are timestamps, K as (K bs ) is the key shared between A and S (B and S), and K ab is the new session key. Both the server S and the responder B check the timestamp. If it is too old, the message (hence, the session key) is ignored.
In order to model this protocol in tCryptoSPA, we use a process Clock, counting the time elapsing, to which other processes can ask for the current time value. Moreover, we use [ m; m ; m trd x] as a shorthand to extract m and also [t6t ]P, which we assume to have an inference system that handles the Boolean relations on arithmetic expressions. With c XY we denote the channel used by X to communicate with Y and vice versa. The complete speciÿcation is reported in Fig. 3 . The lts of P(K ab ) is reported below, where, for the sake of clarity, each labeled transition is decorated also with the channel on which the synchronization takes place and, possibly, with the modiÿed value of the timestamps: This protocol takes two time units to perform the distribution of the key. At the third time unit, A and B are ready to use the session key.
A general schema for the deÿnition of timed security properties
In this section we propose a general schema for the deÿnition of timed security properties. We call it tGNDC, since it is a real-time generalization of generalized NDC (GNDC for short) [10] , which is in turn a generalization of non-deducibility on compositions (NDC for short) [5] . The main idea is the following: a system P is tGNDC / i for every hostile environment (or enemy) X the composition of the system P with X satisÿes the timed speciÿcation (P). Essentially, tGNDC / guarantees that the timed property is satisÿed, with respect to the / timed behavioral relation, even when the system is composed with any possible enemy.
This section is organized as follows. We ÿrst deÿne timed trace semantics (the behavioral semantics of main interest) and timed (bi-)simulation. Then, we discuss the issue of hostile environments, showing that it is necessary to restrict their initial knowledge. Finally, we present the tGNDC schema and some general results of it, some of which are independent of the chosen behavioral notion.
Behavioural semantics
Here we deÿne the semantic pre-order and equivalence we will use to formalyze security properties, timed trace pre-order and equivalence, the timed version of the classical untimed semantics.
The expression P ⇒ P 1 is a shorthand for P( →) * P 1 where ( →) * denotes a (possibly empty) sequence of labeled transitions; the expression P a ⇒ P is a shorthand for P ⇒ P 1 a → P 2 ⇒ P . Let = a 1 ; : : : ; a n ∈ (Act\{ })
* be a sequence of actions; then P ⇒ P i there exist P 1 ; : : : ; P n−1 ∈ P such that P a1 ⇒ P 1 a2 ⇒; : : : ; P n−1
Deÿnition 2. For any P ∈ P the set T (P) of timed traces associated with P is deÿned as follows
The timed trace pre-order, denoted by 6 ttrace , is deÿned as follows: P6 ttrace Q i T (P) ⊆ T (Q). P and Q are timed trace equivalent, denoted by P = ttrace Q, if T (P) = T (Q).
As an example, it is easy to see that T (P(K ab )) = { ; tick; tick tick; tick tick tick}, where denotes the empty sequence.
We deÿne the concept of timed weak simulation as usual.
Deÿnition 3. We say that a relation R among processes is a timed weak simulation, if for every (P; Q) ∈ R we have:
-If P a → P ; a = , then there exists Q s.t. Q a ⇒ Q and (P ; Q ) ∈ R. -If P → P , then there exists Q s.t. Q ⇒ Q and (P ; Q ) ∈ R.
If R and R −1 are weak timed simulations then R is called timed weak bi-simulation. Let ≺ (≈) the union of all timed weak simulations (bi-simulations) among processes. Then, we have ≺ ⊆ 6 ttrace and so ≈ ⊆ = ttrace .
Hostile environments
Here we characterize the notion of admissible hostile environments, similar to what is done in [10] for the untimed setting. Such a characterization is necessary to analyze protocols where some information is assumed to be secret, as in cryptographic protocols. A hostile environment, or enemy, is a process which tries to attack a protocol by stealing and faking information which is transmitted on public channels, say C. Such an agent is modeled as a generic process X which can communicate only through channels in C, imposing some constraints on the initial data that are known by the enemy and requiring that such a protocol is weakly time alive, i.e., the agent may always perform tick eventually. Otherwise X could prevent time from elapsing when composed in parallel with some system, since in a compound system time can pass i all components let it pass. So the enemy could block the time ow and we want to avoid this unrealistic case. Let Der(P) be the set of all derivatives of P, i.e., all the P's reachable from P through a sequence of actions in Act.
Deÿnition 4. A process P is directly weakly time alive i P tick ⇒ P . P is weakly time alive i for all P ∈ Der(P), we have P is directly weakly time alive.
It is useful to deÿne the set of messages that a process initially knows, i.e., ID(P). Given a process P, we call ID(P) the set of messages that appear in P. More formally, we deÿne ID(P) as I (P; ∅), where I : P × 2 Const → 2 M is given in Fig. 4 . Informally, I (P; V ) is a function that recursively visits the sub-terms of P and the body of the constants in use. The argument V is used to check that the unwinding of a constant deÿnition is performed only once.
Let ⊆ M be the initial knowledge we would like to give to the enemies, i.e., the public information such as the names of the entities and the public keys, plus some possible private data of the enemies (e.g., their private key or nonces). For some enemy X , we want all the messages in ID(X ) to be deducible from . If this is not the case, then an enemy would be unrealistic, as it would know in advance the secrets. We thus deÿne the set tE I C of timed hostile processes as tE C = {X ∈ P | sort(X ) ⊆ C and ID(X ) ⊆ D( ) and X is weakly time alive}:
The tGNDC schema
In this section we formally deÿne the tGNDC / family of properties. We will use A C B as a shorthand for (A B)\C. The proposed family of security properties is as follows.
Deÿnition 5. P is tGNDC / i ∀X ∈ tE I C : (P C X ) / (P) where / ∈ P × P is a preorder, C is a set of channels and : P → P is a function between processes deÿning the property speciÿcation for P as the process (P).
We propose a su cient criterion for a static characterization (i.e., not involving the universal quantiÿcation ∀) of tGNDC / properties. We will say that / is a precongruence w.r.t. C if it is a pre-order and for every P; Q; Q ∈ P if Q / Q then P C Q / P C Q . Thus it is easy to prove the following:
If / is a pre-congruence w.r.t. C and if there exists a process Top ∈ tE I C such that for every process X ∈ tE I C we have X / Top, then ∀ :
Thus if for every process X ∈ tE I C we have X / Top then we will also have (P C X ) / (P C Top) for every process X ∈ tE I C and so, as by hypothesis (P C Top) / (P), we obtain (P C X ) / (P Top) / (P); ∀X ∈ tE I C , i.e., P is tGNDC / . (⇒) By deÿnition of tGNDC / , since Top ∈ tE I C .
In particular, if the hypotheses of the proposition above hold, then it is su cient to check that (P) is satisÿed when P is composed with the most general hostile environment Top. This permits to make only one single check, in order to prove that a property holds for all possible attackers. We also have the following corollary for the congruence induced by /. Corollary 1. Let / be a pre-congruence w.r.t. C and let ≡ = / ∩ / −1 . If there exist two processes Bot; Top ∈ tE I C such that for every process X ∈ tE I C we have Bot/X/Top then
Given these very general results, we show that they can be rephrased in the model we presented so far. Indeed, this is the case of the trace pre-order 6 ttrace , which is a pre-congruence.
Proposition 3. Timed trace pre-order is a pre-congruence w.r.t. C .
Proof. Given P; Q; Q ∈ P such that Q6 ttrace Q , we have to prove P C Q6 ttrace P C Q . This can be done by induction on the length of the timed traces generated by P C Q.
Note that in the tSPA model, timed trace pre-order is not a pre-congruence, since the semantic rules enforce the so-called maximal communication progress, i.e., when a communication is possible it must start immediately, and it is not possible to perform a tick [9] . Now we single out the minimal element Bot and the maximum element Top in tE I C w.r.t. 6 ttrace . As for Bot, it is clear that the minimum set of traces is generated by the weakly time alive process that does nothing, i.e., by process Ã(0). As a matter of fact, (P Ã(0)) = ttrace P for timed trace equivalence and most other equivalences. We thus deÿne the Top element 1 using a family of processes Top The initial element of the family is Top C; I ttrace as I is the initial knowledge of the enemy. This may accept any input message to be bound to the variable x which is then added to the knowledge set that becomes I ∪ {x}, and may output only messages that can pass on the channel c and that are deducible from the current knowledge set via the deduction function D. Furthermore, it can let time pass. Note that summands are not considered, as inessential for trace pre-order. We may prove the following:
Proof. By induction on the length of the timed traces generated by X .
Some timed security properties
In this section we show how to redeÿne four timed security properties as suitable instances of the tGNDC / schema, by suitably deÿning function . As for the behavioral semantics /, we will always consider the timed trace semantics. The four properties we consider are:
-The timed version of NDC [5] , which has been proposed to study information ow security; we will show that tNDC is the strongest property in the tGNDC / family, under some mild assumptions. -A timed notion of authentication, called timed agreement (see also [17] ), according to which agreement must be reached within a certain deadline, otherwise authentication does not hold.
-A timed notion of secrecy, we call timed secrecy, according to which a message is secret only within a time interval and after the deadline it can become a public piece of information. -A timed notion of integrity, called timed integrity, which simply requires a correct delivery of messages within a certain amount of time.
tNDC
We start with tNDC since tGNDC / is a generalization of such a property. The underlying idea is that the system behavior must be invariant w.r.t. composition with every hostile environment. Indeed, there is no possibility of establishing a communication (i.e., sending information). In the CryptoSPA untimed setting the NDC 2 idea can thus be deÿned as follows (see [10] ):
C , we have (P C X ) = trace P\C. Where = trace is trace equivalence and the only di erence with the deÿnition given in SPA is that the knowledge of process X is bounded by I . Now we present timed NDC (tNDC, for short) [9] which is the natural extension of NDC to a timed setting.
Deÿnition 7. P ∈ tNDC i ∀X ∈ tE I C we have (P C X ) = ttrace P\C. Where the di erence is that we use the timed hostile environment and timed trace equivalence.
Note that tNDC corresponds to tGNDC P\C =ttrace . It is also possible to apply Corollary 1 obtaining the following static characterization.
Proposition 5. P ∈ tNDC i (P C Top C; I ttrace ) = ttrace P\C. Now we suggest that tNDC is the most restrictive (P), hence inducing the strongest property for timed trace semantics. The most restrictive (P) should return an encapsulation of protocol P, i.e., a version of P which is completely isolated from the environment, corresponding to the execution of P in a perfectly secure network where only the honest parties are present. In our process algebra setting, this corresponds to the restriction of all public channels in C along which protocol messages are sent.
Note that for every process P we have (P Ã(0))\C = ttrace P\C. This means that P restricted on C is equivalent to the protocol in composition with the enemy that does nothing. Note also that, by deÿnition, Ã(0) ∈ tE C for every . So it is very natural to consider functions and processes P such that P\C6 ttrace (P). This simply means that the protocol P is correct (as it satisÿes its speciÿcation (P)) at least when it is not under attack. This condition can somehow be seen as a reasonable criterion for any good protocol: it must be correct at least when it is not under attack! Under this mild assumption, it is clear that P ∈ tNDC implies P ∈ tGNDC 6ttrace . This form of reasoning shows one of the main advantages of the GNDC idea, that tries to unify concepts from di erent areas such as information ow and cryptographic protocol analysis. The uniform schema, in this paper extended in a timed setting, allows us to easily compare di erent security properties.
Another way to avoid universal quantiÿcation over all the admissible enemies is to show the equivalence between tNDC and timed strong non-deterministic noninterference (tSNNI for short); such an equivalence result holds in the untimed case [5] , but it does not hold for tSPA [9] because of the maximal communication assumption of that language.
A CryptoSPA process is SNNI C if P\C, where all actions in C are forbidden, behaves like the system P where all the actions in C are hidden (i.e., transformed into internal actions). To express this second system we need to introduce ÿrst the hiding operator P= C:
Now we are ready to deÿne the property timed SNNI C as follows.
Deÿnition 8.
A process is tSNNI C if P\C = ttrace P= C.
It is rather intuitive that P= C can be seen as P C Top, where Top is the top element of the trace pre-order for CryptoSPA. Hence, such a static characterization can be seen as a corollary of the existence of a top element in the trace pre-order (together with the fact that trace pre-order is a pre-congruence).
Proposition 6. For every P ∈ P we have that (P C Top C; ttrace ) = ttrace P= C.
Proof. We have to prove (P C Top C; ttrace )6 ttrace P= C and the symmetric relation ((P C Top C; ttrace )6 ttrace P C Top C; ttrace ). These can be done by induction on the length of the traces generated by the left-hand-side processes.
Proof. By Propositions 5 and 6.
We can also extend the bi-simulation strong non-deterministic non-interference (BSNNI for short) property deÿned in [5] in our setting.
Deÿnition 9. A process is tBSNNI C if P\C ≈ P= C.
Indeed, this property requires that the equivalence used to compare P\C and P= C is timed weak bi-simulation. We can prove a result similar to Proposition 6. Proposition 8. For every P ∈ P we have that (P C Top C; ttrace ) ≈ P= C.
Proof. By checking that the following relation is a timed weak bi-simulation:
ttrace ; P= C) | P ∈ P; ⊆ M}:
Unfortunately, we cannot prove a proposition as Proposition 5. As a matter of fact, also in the case without cryptography and time, it is not true that checking a system only against the Top process is enough to avoid the universal quantiÿcation (e.g. see [5] ).
However, checking tBSNNI C may be an e cient method for checking tSNNI C . Indeed, we have tBSNNI C ⊆ tSNNI C and timed weak bi-simulation is decidable in polynomial time for ÿnite processes, while checking trace inclusion is a PSPACE-complete problem.
Timed Agreement
We now present the Timed Agreement property [17] : "A protocol guarantees Timed Agreement between a responder B and an initiator A on a set of data items ds if, whenever B (acting as responder) completes a run of the protocol, apparently with initiator A, then A has previously been running the protocol, apparently with B, in the last n ticks (where n is a preÿxed timeout value) and the two agents agreed on the data values corresponding to all the variables in ds, and each such a run of B corresponds to a unique run of A."
As done in [10] for the non-real-time version of Agreement, what we do is to have for each party an action representing the running of a protocol and another one representing its completion. We consider an action commit res(B; A; d) representing a correct termination of B as a responder, convinced to communicate with A that agrees on data d. On the other hand, we have an action running ini(A; B; d) that represents the fact that A is running the protocol as initiator, apparently with B, with data d. If we specify these two actions in the protocol, the Timed Agreement property requires that when B executes commit res(B; A; d), then A has previously executed running ini(A; B; d) and at most n tick actions, where n is the preÿxed timeout value, occurred between these actions. We assume that the actions representing the running and the commit are correctly speciÿed in the protocol. We can see them as output actions over two particular channels running ini and commit res. We assume that d can assume values in a set D. Let NotObs(P) = sort(P)\(C ∪ {running ini; commit res}) be the set of channels in P that are not public and that are di erent from running ini and commit res, i.e., that will not be observed. Function Note that P is essentially the process that executes every possible action over channels in sort(P) which are not in C and that are di erent from running ini and commit res, or let time pass. Given P, t(n) tAgree (P) represents the most general system which satisÿes the Timed Agreement property and which has the same sort of P. In fact in t(n) tAgree (P) action running ini(x; y; d) always precedes commit res(y; x; d) for every datum d, and every combination of the other actions of P can be executed. Finally, the number of tick actions is at most n. In order to analyze more than one session, it su ces to consider an extended which has several processes P in parallel. Note that only actions like running ini and commit res are relevant for the agreement analysis.
We desire that, even in the presence of a hostile process, P does not execute traces that are not in t(n) tAgree (P). So we can give the following deÿnition:
Deÿnition 10. P satisÿes Timed Agreement i P is tGNDC t(n) tAgree (P) 6 ttrace , i.e., ∀X ∈ tE I C : (P C X )6 ttrace t(n) tAgree (P):
Example 6. We consider here the WMF protocol presented in Section 2.3. In this speciÿcation we consider a server that can receive requests from both A and B as initiators. Note that time parameter n is 3 because in a correct execution 3 ticks are performed in between running ini and commit res. Indeed, the protocol P, in parallel with the enemy E, produces the following trace:
running ini(A; B; K ab ):tick:tick:tick:tick:tick:commit res(B; A; K ab ) that is not in
tAgree since the number of ticks is greater than n = 3. Note that, in fact, the actions running ini(A; B; K ab ) and commit res(B; A; K ab ) are correctly executed, but the enemy forces B to accept an old key. In an untimed setting this would be a correct execution of the protocol. The problem here is, on the one hand, that the message produced by S can easily be used by the enemy to start a new run of the protocol having as initiator the intended receiver of the previous run, and on the other hand that, when B receives the key, he has no way to know when A forged it.
Timed Secrecy
We now present the Timed Secrecy property: "A protocol guarantees to an initiator A the property of Timed Secrecy on a set of data items ds within a time n if, whenever a data item in ds becomes public, at least n ticks passed since A started the protocol."
As for Timed Agreement, what we do is to have an action representing the running of a protocol and another one representing a secret being revealed. We consider an action running ini(A; d) that represents the fact that A is running the protocol as initiator, with datum d. On the other hand, we have an action public(d) representing that data item d is made public. If we specify these two actions in the protocol, the Timed Secrecy property requires that when someone executes public(d) then A has executed running ini(A; d) and at least n tick actions, where n is the preÿxed timeout value, occurred between them. We assume that the actions representing the running and the publication are correctly speciÿed in the protocol. We can see the ÿrst action as an output over a particular channel running ini. The second action, following the approach of [6] is performed by a particular process called key expired notiÿer (KEN ) that reads from a public channel c not used in the protocol and performs the output of what it has read on the channel public, i.e., KEN = c(x):public(x).
Let NotObs(P) = sort(P)\(C ∪ {c; running ini; public}) be the set of channels in P that are not public and that are di erent from running ini and public, i.e., that will not be observed. We assume that d can take values in a set of secret values D. Function tSec (P) = P P (A):
Given P, t(n) tSec (P) represents the most general system which satisÿes the Timed Secrecy property and which has the same sort as P. In fact, in t(n) tSec (P), the action public(d) may be executed only after n ticks from the action running ini(x; d) for all data d, and every combination of the other actions of P can be executed. In order to analyze more than one session, it su ces to consider an extended which has several processes P in parallel.
We want that even in the presence of a hostile process, P does not execute traces that are not in t(n) tSec (P). So we can give the following deÿnition:
Example 7. We consider the following protocol:
(1) A → S : A; {B; T a ; K ab ; Exp} Kas , (2) S → B : {A; T s ; K ab ; Exp } K bs , which is a variant of the WMF Protocol in which we add a ÿeld Exp used to state how long the key will last before expiring. After that time the key is no longer valid and will be made public by B. Both the server S and B check the value Exp and upgrade it according to the amount of time passed. c is the public channel used to throw away expired keys, while KEN is the process that we use to write on the private channel public.
We assume that we have two servers that update the ÿeld Exp in a di erent way. In particular server S 2 decreases at double speed (w.r.t. S 1 ) the key expiration time, so that it is possible to have secure keys that will last less. An enemy E, by using server S 2 , could make the key appear as expired to the intended recipient, by simply redirecting to server S 2 the message intended for server S 1 . We suppose that n = 4. The enemy could attack the protocol in the following way:
As B receives the third message and upgrades the value of Exp, it becomes 1 and so the key will be made public even if only 3 ticks passed.
The protocol P composed in parallel with enemy E could produce the following trace:
running ini(A; K ab ):tick:tick:tick:public(K ab ) that is not in t(n) tSec since the number of ticks is less than n = 4.
Timed Integrity
We now present the Timed Integrity property: "A protocol guarantees to the user B the property of Timed Integrity on a set of data items ds within a time n if B only accepts data items in ds and this may only happen in at most n ticks since the beginning of the protocol."
For instance, imagine that you would like to receive your favorite newspaper each day before noon. This may be expressed as an integrity property rather than an authenticity one, since you are not actually interested in the sender but simply in the data (the newspaper). Consider a channel out used for expressing the reception of a message and let NotObs(P) = sort(P)\(C ∪ {out}) be the set of channels in P that are not public and let d range over a set of data D. Then, Timed Integrity may be formally speciÿed as follows: P (y; n) = d∈D tick 1 : : : : :tick n : :Ã(0) + Ã(out(y; d):Ã(0)); P = c∈NotObs(P) Ã(c(x):P ) + c∈NotObs(P);m∈M Ã( cm:P ); t(n) tInt (P) = P P (B; n):
Compositional analysis
In this section we illustrate some compositional proof rules for establishing that a system enjoys a tGNDC property, in particular tSNNI C . However, remember that as it is equivalent to tNDC, this property implies all the other ones based on trace semantics, that are the most frequently used in security analysis.
A compositional proof rule for checking a property f works as follows: in order to check if a system P Q satisÿes f it is enough to check whether both P and Q satisfy f. Compositional reasoning is useful in many cases. For instance, an interesting ÿeld of application is the analysis of systems with an arbitrary number of equal components. Let us consider the parallel composition of multiple instances of process P: n P : : : P To prove that this system enjoys f (for whatever n) it is su cient to prove that P enjoys f.
Within the SPA theory, SNNI is compositional, i.e., if P; Q ∈ SNNI then (P Q) ∈ SNNI . Unfortunately, the same does not hold when considering enemies with limited knowledge, as for tSNNI C . For instance, consider the processes:
Now, assuming C = {c 1 ; c 2 } and = ∅, we have that P; Q ∈ tSNNI C . However, P Q ∈ tSNNI . As a matter of fact, (P Q)\C is equivalent to 0, while (P Q)= C may perform both c 3 m 1 and c 3 m 2 . The problem is the following: The information acquired by an intruder interacting with one process is useful to interfere with the other one. However, if we strengthen the assumptions we can get a compositional rule for establishing that a process belongs to tSNNI C . The stability assumption we make is that the process cannot signiÿcantly increase its knowledge.
Deÿnition 12. We say that a process P is stable w.r.t. , whenever if
Stability (w.r.t. a knowledge ) is a compositional property.
Proposition 9. Assume that P; Q ∈ tSNNI C and that P; Q are stable w.r.t. . Then P Q is stable w.r.t. . This is useful to show the compositional principle on the whole observational behavior of the processes.
Proposition 10. Assume that P; Q ∈ tSNNI C and that P; Q are stable w.r.t. . Then P Q ∈ tSNNI C . Proposition 11. Assume that P; Q ∈ tBSNNI C and that P; Q are stable w.r.t. . Then P Q ∈ tBSNNI C . Example 8. We consider a simple example of the application of the principle above. Consider the processes P = c{m} k :0 and Q = c?x:[x k dec z] . Consider also the process KEN = c?x:[x = m]:public m. Assuming = {{m} k } and C = {c}, we can establish that P; Q; KEN ∈ tSNNI C and are all stable; hence P Q KEN ∈ tSNNI C , which means that P Q keeps m secret. As a matter of fact, we have (P Q KEN )\C = ttrace 0:
We may derive a proof principle for the tGNDC 6ttrace schema, again under the assumption that the involved processes are stable.
Proposition 12. Given the set of initial knowledge and the set of public channels C, assume P i ∈ tGNDC i (Pi) 6ttrace , with i = 1; 2, and P 1 ; P 2 to be stable w.r.t. . It follows that P 1 P 2 ∈ tGNDC 1 (P1) 2 (P2) 6ttrace and P 1 P 2 is stable w.r.t. .
Proof.
The proof follows by noticing that (P 1 P 2 )= C6 ttrace P 1 = C P 2 = C. Then, by hypothesis and Proposition 6, we have P i = C6 ttrace i (P i ), with i = 1; 2, and the thesis then follows because 6 ttrace is a pre-congruence w.r.t. .
Note that whenever (P 1 ) (P 2 )6 ttrace (P 1 P 2 ) then we get a compositional proof rule for tGNDC . 
Time-dependent stability and compositional results
We give a new result about conditions for safe composition of cryptoprotocols where time plays an essential role. In order to achieve this result, we should reÿne the concept of stability given above, by introducing time-dependent stability.
In the previous section we noticed that if we assume that the intruder knowledge does not increase when composing the intruder process with P (i.e., P X ) and with Q (i.e., Q X ) (using the same communication channels) then the intruder knowledge does not increase when composing the intruder itself with the process P Q. Unfortunately, such a form of stability is not time-dependent and so it is unsuited to check properties based on a timed notion of secrecy. This does not make it feasible to check protocols such as TESLA [21] , whose security features exactly depend on a form of timed secrecy. To clarify this point consider the following example.
Example 10. The process P = tick: ck:Ã(0) keeps the secrecy of k for one time unit. In the more complex process Q = (c(x):[x = k]: cm) + tick:Ã(0) the secrecy of k in the ÿrst time unit is crucial to get the secrecy of m. Indeed, either Q is willing to receive the key k only in the ÿrst time unit (if so, it releases m) or it starts to idle. Unfortunately, each stable set must contain the message k, and so also the message m. Thus, our compositional proof principles cannot be applied. However, we may note that if we could reason about stability in each time slot then we can reÿne the proof principle in order to cope with such cases.
We let be a sequence of actions (possibly empty) ranging over Act\{ }. Let # tick ( ) be the number of occurrences of tick actions in the sequence . The following new deÿnition will allow us to cope with timed secrecy and security properties of protocols that rely on it.
Deÿnition 13. We say that a process P is time-dependent stable (t.d. stable) w.r.t. the sequence { i } i¿0 if, whenever (P X 0 )\C ⇒ (P X )\C and
Basically, a process P is t.d. stable when an enemy cannot increase signiÿcantly its knowledge when P runs in the space of a time slot.
The following propositions hold.
Proposition 13. Given a sequence { i } and a set of public channels C, assume P 1 ; P 2 to be t. 13) and so m will never belong to the knowledge of the intruder (whose initial knowledge is ∅).
Using time-dependent stability, we were able to check timed secrecy and timed integrity for a relevant protocol such as TESLA in [14] .
Conclusions
We have shown how to extend the GNDC schema to a real-time setting while preserving the properties of the untimed schema. In particular, we have shown the existence of the "most powerful" timed enemy, at least for the timed trace semantics. We have also shown how to express uniformly in this general schema some timed security properties, such as timed non-deducibility on compositions, (one deÿnition of) timed authentication, timed secrecy and timed integrity. We have also introduced a compositional proof principle that allows us to safely compose two security protocols, while preserving the security properties they enjoy. Such a compositional proof principle has been extended to cope with real time. One may wonder if the stability condition is too restrictive. As a matter of fact, our compositional proof principles can be successfully applied for checking security properties, e.g., message integrity, in stream signature protocols as the ones in [4, 11, 20, 21] . See [13, 14, 18] for some preliminary results.
Related literature on real-time security include the prominent papers [23, 2] . The former paper presents tock-CSP (a real-time language similar to tSPA) that is used to specify real-time cryptographic protocols. The main di erences consists of a different treatment of timed operators, in the absence of a mechanism for handling crypto-primitives, in the lack of a uniform schema, and in the absence of compositionality results. The latter paper [2] is mainly concerned with the model checking of the interesting case study of TESLA, a protocol for stream broadcasting over the Internet. The main focus is on showing that it is possible to give a ÿnite model for the unbounded supply of fresh cryptographic keys used during the protocol. The so-called security condition of the protocol is similar to timed agreement.
Compositional proof techniques for reasoning about cryptographic protocols in an untimed setting may be found in [1, 16] . In [1] , a compositional proof system for an environment-sensitive bi-simulation has been developed. One main di erence with our approach, is that we consider a weak notion of observation where the internal actions are not visible. This permits us to have more abstract speciÿcations. (As a matter of fact, the authors of [1] leave as future work the treatment of such a form of weak equivalence.) In [16] , the authors develop the concept of disjoint encryption and, under this hypothesis, are able to perform compositional reasoning both for secrecy and authentication properties. While on the one hand, their approach seems to deal better with authentication properties than ours, on the other one it seems that there are situations where stability holds while disjoint encryption does not. We leave as future work a comparison of the e ectiveness of the di erent approaches for compositional analysis of security properties.
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Appendix. Proofs
Here we present some detailed proofs omitted from the main body of the paper. The other proofs are similar to those presented here.
Proposition 13. Given a sequence { i } and a set of public channels C, assume P 1 ; P 2 t.d. stable w.r.t. { i }. It follows that P 1 P 2 is t.d. stable w.r.t. { i }.
Proof. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that ci = D( i ), for each i. By contradiction, consider a computation s.t.
(P 1 P 2 X 0 )\C ⇒ (P 1 P 2 X )\C and D( ) = D( i ) = i . Then, it means that P 1 P 2 outputs at least one message m s.t. m ∈ i . Let m 1 be the ÿrst (and last) of such messages sent during the computation under consideration. Assume, without loss of generality, that m 1 has been sent by P 1 . Thus, we must have:
During the preÿx of the computation, P 2 emitted over channels in C only messages in i , for each time slot i. Otherwise P 2 would not be t.d. stable w.r.t. { i } i¿0 . So, the trace may be simulated by P 1 in composition with X i . But this implies that (P 1 X 0 )\C ⇒ (P 1 X )\C and D( ) = D( i ). This leads to a contradiction since we assumed P 1 t.d. stable w.r.t. { i } i¿0 . The generic case with an arbitrary number of processes can be proved by induction (on the number n of processes).
Proposition 16. Assume that P 1 and P 2 are t.d. stable w.r.t. { i }; then, (P 1 P 2 Top 0 ) \ C6 trace (P 1 Top 0 ) \ C (P 2 Top 0 ) \ C:
Proof. The proof consists in checking that the following relation is a weak simulation: R = {((P P Top i ) \ C; (P Top i ) \ C (P Top i ) \ C) | ×(P 1 P 2 Top i ) \ C ⇒ (P P Top i ) \ C; # tick ( ) = i}:
-Assume (P P Top i )\C am → (P 1 P Top i )\C due to a transition P am → P 1 , with a ∈ C. Then, also (P Top i ) \ C (P Top i ) \ C am → (P 1 Top i ) \ C (P Top i ) \ C. If the transition is due to a receiving action by P or one of the processes performs an internal computation then the reasoning is similar.
-Assume (P P Top i )\C → (P 1 P 1 Top i )\C due to a transition P am → P 1 and P a(m) → P 1 . If a ∈ C then the case is easy. Otherwise, since m ∈ D( i ) (recall that P 1 P 1 is t.d. stable), we have that (P Top i )\C → (P 1 Top i )\C and (P Top i ) \C → (P 2 Top i )\C. Thus, we get
The case of synchronization between P (P ) and Top i is a simpliÿed instance of the previous case.
-Assume(P P Top i )\C tick → (P 1 P 1 Top i+1 )\C is due to a time synchronization, i.e., P \C and (P 1 Top i )\C tick → (P 1 Top i+1 )\C (due to time stability of P 1 and P 2 and henceforth of P and P ). Thus, we get
We can generalize the previous result as follows.
Lemma. Assume that {P j } j=1;:::; n are t.d. stable w.r.t. { i } i¿0 ; then, (P 1 : : : P n Top 0 ) \ C6 trace (P 1 Top 0 ) \ C : : : (P n Top 0 ) \ C:
Proof. By induction on n. The base case is trivial. The case n + 1 may be treated as follows:
(P 1 : : : P n P n+1 Top 0 ) \ C 6 trace Lemma 16; (P 1 : : : P n Top 0 ) \ C (P n+1 Top 0 ) \ C 6 trace Induction hypothesis; (P 1 Top 0 ) \ C : : : (P n+1 Top 0 ) \ C: Proposition 15. Assume that P; Q ∈ tBSNNI C and that P; Q are t.d. stable w.r.t. { i }. Then P Q ∈ tBSNNI C .
Proof. The proof may be done by checking that the relation R in the proof of Proposition 16 is actually a timed weak bi-simulation.
